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ABSTRACT
Caveat emptor is one of the most well known maxims of the
legal world. Interpreters from different countries have their own
understanding of this doctrine. At first glance, Louisiana law and
Islamic law have nothing in common. Louisiana, at least
superficially, adheres to the great civil law tradition that the
legislature is supreme. Its primary sources of law are legislation
and custom. Islamic law is divine in origin, a direct manifestation
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of Allah’s will. Its primary sources of law are the Koran and the
wisdom of the Prophet Muhammad. Yet, in practice, these two
systems have developed surprisingly similar approaches toward
duties of disclosure and the doctrine of caveat emptor. The
similarities between the above mentioned legal systems’ approach
to caveat emptor and duties of disclosure are uncanny. Regardless
of whether the issue is dealt under the heading of mistake,
misrepresentation, or error and fraud, there is a commonality of
approach that cannot be missed. Despite this obvious diversity of
methods, traditions and styles, it is possible to notice an element,
or better, a tendency common to the examined regulations, that
may be found more in operational rules than in principle
statements.
I. INTRODUCTION
Looks can be deceiving. At first glance, Louisiana law and
Islamic law have nothing in common. Louisiana, at least
superficially, adheres to the great civil law tradition that the
legislature is supreme. Its primary sources of law are legislation
and custom. Islamic law is divine in origin, a direct manifestation
of Allah’s will. Its primary sources of law are the Koran and the
wisdom of the Prophet Muhammad. Yet, in practice, these two
systems have developed surprisingly similar approaches toward
duties of disclosure and the doctrine of caveat emptor.
Caveat emptor means literally “let the buyer beware.”
Although stated in the language of the great Roman Empire, the
phrase caveat emptor is not a product of Roman Law.1 In fact, it
1. It should be noted, however, that Roman law originally contained a rule
similar to caveat emptor.
See A. ARTHER SCHILLER, ROMAN LAW:
MECHANISMS OF DEVELOPMENT 22 (Mouton 1978). Yet the Roman law
eventually moved towards a warranty based system to protect purchasers. In
contracts of purchase and sale (emptio venditio) the seller (venditor) is in breach
if the thing sold (res vendita) is defective. The edict of the aediles curules, the
Roman officials or magistrates charged with the supervision of public markets,
introduced a warranty against latent defects with a view to protecting the
interests of the purchaser (emptor) who could not be expected to be aware of
such defects. In terms of this aedilitian edict, the seller was liable for any defect
that wholly or substantially impaired the utility or effectiveness of the thing
sold. The purchaser could claim full restitution by means of the actio
redhibitoria or a diminution of the purchase price by means of the actio quanti
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was the common law of England that gave birth to this often used,
yet widely criticized, Latin phrase. First appearing in legal use
around the end of the 16th century,2 the maxim eventually came to
minoris. In later Roman law, the actio empti (the action arising from the
purchase) could be used instead of the aedilitian actions.
Specifically, during the Roman Republic, these magistrates in their edicts,
made rules about the sale of slaves or beasts of burden in the public markets that
required the seller to disclose any illness or defect (be it a physical defect or a
character defect). Also, in regard to slaves, the seller had to disclose if the slave
was a wanderer, fugitive, or suspected of some crime or delict for which his
master might be liable.
The actio redhibitoria (to be brought within six months of the contract of
sale) foresaw the restitutio in integrum, returning the object to the seller and
receiving back the price. While the actio quanti minoris (to be brought within
one year of the contract of sale) sought a decrease in the purchase price,
retaining the object of sale but obtaining the return of part of the price to reflect
the decrease in value of the object. The seller was liable whether or not he knew
of the defect and also if he had made claims that were not true (i.e. that the
object of the sale was free from particular defects or possessed particular
qualities).
Under Justinian, these actions were available generally for all objects of
sale, whether or not the item was sold in a public market. Moreover, the actio
empti could be used to achieve the same result of these actions, making them
superfluous though they still existed.
The first application of the aedilitian remedies is based upon the general
principle that the seller is under a duty to disclose, and assume liability for, all
latent defects which make the thing sold unfit for its intended purpose. F. DE
ZULUETA, THE ROMAN LAW OF SALE 50 (1957). For an account of the evolution
and operation of this edict in Roman Law and its role in modern Roman Dutch
Law, see A.M. Honoré, The History of the Aedilitian Actions from Roman to
Roman Dutch Law, in D. DAUBE, STUDIES IN THE ROMAN LAW OF SALE 132-159
(1959). A full discussion of Roman law is, however, beyond the scope of this
article.
2. W.H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L. J. 1133
(1931); A.M. Musy, Disclosure of Information in the Pre-Contractual
Bargaining: A Comparative Analysis, 1 CARDOZO ELECTRONIC LAW BULLETIN
16,
4
(1995),
http://www.jus.unitn.it/cardozo/Review/Contract/Musy1995/musy1.htm (last visited September 20, 2009); A. PROTON, FROM CAVEAT
EMPTOR TO CAVEAT VENDITOR IN SALES OF DEFECTIVE HOMES: TOWARD A
CONSENSUS BETWEEN CIVILIAN AND COMMON LAW TRADITIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES? 13, 15 (1992). Caveat emptor first appeared in print in a discussion
involving horse trading. Hamilton, supra at 1164. It was written that, “If [the
horse] be tame enough and have been rydden upon, then caveat emptor,” and
referring to situations where a horse was sold with no warranty, then such a sale
was said to be “at the other’s peril, for his eyes and his taste ought to be his
judges.” Id. Apparently, around the same time, a Lancaster ordinance, while not
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dominate English policy on the seller’s duty of disclosure. That
dominance can be said to have begun in the case of Chandler v.
Lopus in 1603.3
In Chandler, a goldsmith sold a purported bezoar stone4 to
an uninformed buyer.5 The buyer later discovered that the stone
was not, in fact, a real bezoar.6 The purchaser brought an action in
trespass in the case7 to recover the value he had paid for the stone.8
The court held that “the bare affirmatio n that it was a bezarstone[sic], without warranting it to be so, is no cause of action.”9
The court further stated that it was immaterial that the goldsmith
knew that the stone was not a bezoar because so long as he does
not warrant such a quality, a buyer does not have cause of action.10
Chandler is an example of caveat emptor in its purest form. A
seller has no duty to disclose defects in the item he is selling (even
if he knows of the defect); while the buyer has a right to inspect the
item he is purchasing to ensure it is free from any defect. In effect,
it is a policy choice on the burden of inspection. The buyer has the
burden of making sure he is getting what he wants. If the buyer
fails to fully inform himself about the item he is purchasing, it is
his own fault if he gets something other than what he intended.
While caveat emptor once reigned supreme in the Western legal

employing the word caveat emptor, dealt with malt purchases by stating, “let
their eye be their champion.” Id.
3. Hamilton, supra note 2, at 1166. This, however, was not the first case to
deal with the issue of caveat emptor. In fact, two years earlier it was argued in
Moore v. Hussey that a law quoted incorrectly as “Caveat emptor, qui ignorari
non debuit quod alienum jus emit” applied in a case dealing with the law of
estates and the value of a marriage; the judge dismissed the claim as irrelevant.
Id. at 1165.
4. A bezoar stone is any “various calculi found chiefly in the gastrointestinal organs and formerly believed to possess magical properties.”
MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com
(last visited September 20, 2009).
5. Chandelor v. Lopus, Cro. Jac. 4, 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (1603).
6. Id.
7. “At common law, an action to recover damages that are not the
immediate result of a wrongful act but rather a later consequence. This action
was the precursor to a variety of modern-day tort claims, including negligence,
nuisance, and business torts.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1542 (8th ed. 2004).
8. Chandelor v. Lopus, Cro. Jac. 4, 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (1603).
9. Id.
10. Id.
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tradition, changing notions of fairness have softened its effect.
Modern legal institutions, which include items such as implied
warranties and pre-contractual duties of disclosure, have shifted
much of the buyer’s duty back onto the seller. Thus, caveat
emptor is largely an echo of an age past.
The purpose of this article is two-fold. Firstly, it seeks to give
an accurate depiction of the approach toward pre-contractual duties
of disclosure in two legal systems, the Islamic law and Louisiana
Law. Secondly, it attempts to juxtapose these two systems so as to
highlight their similarities and differences. Overall, the authors
hope to use this comparison to show that the rule of law has
evolved in surprisingly similar ways through two drastically
different legal systems.
II. SOURCES AND APPLICATION OF LAW
Islamic law is generally called Shari'a, which refers to the set
of divinely revealed rules that Muslims must comply with to
perform their religious duties. The Shari'a aims to fulfil the
spiritual and material welfare of the 600 million humans who
follow Islam, nearly a sixth of entire population of the world.11 At
the same time, the Shari´a seeks to regulate the entire lives of
those under its authority.
The crucial difference between the law in Islam and the law in
the countries that follow the western legal tradition is their source
of validity. In the western tradition, the legislator or judge is
supreme, depending on whether a particular country belongs to the
civil or common law tradition. For instance, in Louisiana, as in
many systems belonging to the Western tradition, the primary
sources of law are legislation and custom.12 Legislation is the sole
11. The academic publications regarding Islamic law are numerous. To
quote the ones with a comparative approach see R. DAVID & C. JAUFFRETSPINOSI, I GRANDI SISTEMI GIURIDICI CONTEMPORANEI (R. Sacco ed., 5th ed.,
2004) and the original French text in R. DAVID & C. JAUFFRET-SPINOSI, LES
A.
GRANDS SYSTÈMES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAINS (10th ed. 1992); and
GAMBARO & R. SACCO, SISTEMI GIURIDICI COMPARATI (2d ed. 2002).
Regarding the specific topic of the law of obligation see D. SANTILLANA, I-II
ISTITUZIONI DI DIRITTO MUSULMANO MALICHITA CON RIGUARDO ANCHE AL
SISTEMA SCIAFIITA (1926-1938).
12. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1 (2009). Louisiana is considered a mixed
jurisdiction, made up of a combination of both civil and common law.
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expression of legislator’s will and custom, although a primary
source of law, cannot trump a legislative mandate.13 Islamic law,
however, is the direct manifestation of the will of the Almighty; it
is not given by a human lawmaker. Hence, Islamic law is
immutable and because God is the source of authority and the sole
sovereign lawgiver, all human legislation must conform to the
divine will.14
The primary written source of Islamic law is the Koran, Islam’s
holiest scripture, which regulates both legal and non-legal issues.
The second written source of Islamic law is the Sunna, a
compilation of the conversations,15 actions, affirmations,
aphorisms, characteristics, and deeds attributed to the Prophet
Muhammad.16 Beyond these sources, the Shari'a as a discipline
was formed over the centuries through the systematic scholarship
developed by jurists of competing schools of law. In this sense,
Sharia is a jurist’s law just as the common law is a judge’s law and
the civil law is the law of a legislator.17
Islamic law is applied through a method very similar to the
civil law. Through the science of fiqh, jurists determine a rule of
law by first consulting the sacred sources and then by applying
their own reasoning.18 To prevent the risk of having a huge

However, only in the absence of legislation and custom can a judge step in to
make law, and in that instance the legislature requires him to rule based on the
equitable notions of justice, reason, and prevailing usages. See id. at art. 4.
13. See id. at arts. 2, 3.
14. F. Kutty, The Shari'a Factor in International Commercial Arbitration,
28 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 565 (2006).
15. The conversations are also known as the hadith.
16. The elements of the Sunna were reported after Muhammad’s death by
his companions and collected by scholars over the centuries. The process of
hadithcompiling for the Sunnis is restricted to the work of six main compilers:
Bukhari (d. 256/870), Muslim (d. 251/865), Ibn Majjah (d. 273/886), Abu
Dawud (d. 274/888), Tirmidhi (d. 279/892) and Nasa'i (d. 302/915). Kutty,
supra note 14, at 585.
17. See U. MATTEI & P. G. MONATERI, INTRODUZIONE BREVE AL DIRITTO
COMPARATO (1997).
18. Fiqh is case law and its products are the result of the jurist's intellectual
construct. With English common law it shares the inductive method by
adducing a number of examples out of which some more general principles can
be drawn. It does not posit, as in the civil law tradition, a set of principles from
which application derives. But fiqh is different from both in that it is eminently
casuistic, whilst these cases are not necessarily based on precedents in real life.
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number of opinions, a perpetual issue in common-law systems, AsSafi, a famous jurist,19 created the doctrine of the four roots of
Islamic law to give jurists a fix and common method of finding
law.20 The first root is, of course, the Qu’ran the second is the
Sunnah; the third is the Ijma (the consensus reached by the Islamic
community); and the fourth is the qiyas (analogy).21 The four roots
are widely accepted in the Islamic community and have suffered
only slight changes through history. One such change has practical
relevance: a proposition can be regarded as a rule of law if at any
time legal scholars agreed on the issue (something like the Roman
idea of the communis opinio prudentium).22
The Islamic tradition affirms that the Holy Law is not given to
man ready-made, to be passively received and applied. Rather, it
is to be actively constructed on the basis of those sacred texts,
which are its acknowledged sources. The bulk of Shari'a is based
on al ijtihad, the science of interpretation and rule-making based
on the principle that if the sunnah and Qur'an are silent on an
issue, local custom and scholarly opinion may be used as long as
they are consistent with the Qur'an and the sunnah. It means,
therefore, that it is permissible and possible to supplement
religious-based law with customary law and interpretation.23 The

I. GOLDZIHER, INTRODUCTION OF ISLAMIC THEOLOGY AND LAW 36 (1981). A.G.
Muslim, Islamic Laws in Historical Perspective: An Investigation into Problems
and Principles in the Field of Islamization, 31 ISLAMIC Q. 69 (1987). THE
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ISLAM 288 ( J.L. Esposito ed., 2003). Fiqh is “human
efforts to codify Islamic norms in practical terms” and such “human generated
legislation is considered fallible and open to revision.”
19. As-Safi died in 820. See generally F. CASTRO, DIRITTO MUSULMANO
(2006).
20. K. ZWEIGERT & H. KÖTZ, 1 INTRODUZIONE AL DIRITTO COMPARATO 378
(Barbara Pozzo trans., 1992) and the origial German text in K. ZWEIGERT & H.
KÖTZ, EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG AUF DEM GEBIETE DES
PRIVATRECHTS (2d ed. 1984).
21. A. Hasan, The Definition of Qiyas in Islamic Jurisprudence, 19 ISLAMIC
STUDIES 1, 22 (1980); see also J. Makdisi, Legal Logic and Equity in Islamic
Law, 33 AM. J. COMP. L. 63 (1985); W.B. Hallaq, Legal Reasoning in Islamic
Law and the Common Law: Logic and Method, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 79 (1985).
See generally W.B. Hallaq, Non-Analogical Arguments in Sunni Juridical
Qiyas, 36 ARABICA 286 (1989).
22. ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 20, at 378.
23. According to Bernard Weiss:
The Holy Law is the totality of rules which God has laid down for the
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authority of the jurist is derived from the authority of God, but
there is no authority in the jurist himself.24
Shari’a does not expound general principles in Islamic law and
follow them with their detailed application but rather consists of a
succession of separate issues and topics because it was recorded
“exactly as it had grown up.”25
In a certain sense, like Common law, Islamic law is not written
law. “In the writings of Muslim jurists, the rules of law are rarely
set forth directly and in abstract terms the way they are in a code
elaborated in the civil law tradition or in a statute enacted in a
common law country.”26 The rules of Islamic law are more often
expounded upon in connection with specific cases, and for the
deduction of a generally applicable rule to be expressed in abstract
terms would call for a more or less full survey of the existing case
law.27 Indeed, it is when there is no appropriate legal authority or
the texts are not clear on an issue, the Muslim judge is then
authorized to apply an accepted principle or an assumption that in
his opinion would fit best the issue at hand: Qyas.28
governing of Man's behaviour; it is the aggregate of ahkam shai’ya.
Though ordained by God, few of these rules have been precisely
spelled out for man's convenience; rather, man has the duty to derive
them from their sources. In the standard Islamic metaphor, the rules
themselves are “branches” (furu') or “fruit” (thamara), which grow out
of “roots” (usul), that is, from the sources. Only the roots are given; the
branches or fruit are not - they must be made to appear; and for this to
happen human involvement - we may call it, in keeping with the above
metaphor, human husbandry - is required.
B. Weiss, Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of Ijtihd, 26 AM J. COMP.
L. 199, 201 (1978). The five main schools of thought are the Hanafi, Maliki,
Shafi'i, Hanbali, and Ja'fari schools of jurisprudence. Id.
24. For a discussion on how Shari'a is slow to change in some respects, see
A. E. Mayer, Islam and the State, 12 CARDOZO. L. REV. 1015 (1991). and D.B.
MACDONALD, DEVELOPMENT OF MUSLIM THEOLOGY, JURISPRUDENCE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (1913).
25. N.J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 47 (1978).
26. G.M. Badr, Islamic Law: Its Relation to Other Legal Systems, 26 AM. J.
COMP. L. 187, 189 (1978).
27. Id.
28. C. Moccia, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods and the "Battle of the Forms," 13 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 649, 652 (1989/1990); see also ABDU’R–RAHIM, I PRINCIPI DELLA
GIURISPRUDENZA MUSULAMANA SECONDO LE SCUOLE HANIFITA, MALEKITA,
SCIAFEITA E HANBALITA (Cimino trans., 1922).
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Likewise, a Louisiana lawyer would determine a rule of law
studying a similar list of sources, or roots. First, he would consult
the Civil Code or a relevant revised statute. He would then
analyze the case law interpreting the pertinent article or statute.
Next, he would study scholarly opinions on the issue. Finally, he
would use analogy to advocate for, or against, a particular
decision. Thus, just as the Islamic jurist works his way from the
Koran to the gysas, the Louisiana lawyer starts at the civil code
and ends with an analogy, be it a case or a law.
III. GOOD FAITH, CONTRACTS, AND A DUTY TO DISCLOSE - MAYBE
An Islamic based contract is somewhat different from what we
know in the West.29 Under Shari'a principles, a contract is divine
in nature and there is a sacred duty to uphold one's agreements:
O you who believe fulfil any contracts [that you make] . . .
Fulfil God's agreement once you have pledged to do so, and
do not break any oaths once they have been sworn to. You
have set God up as a Surety for yourselves.30
This idea is best stated by the Islamic maxim, “Al Aqd Shari'at al
muta'aqqidin,” which essentially states, “The contract is the Shari'a
or sacred law of the parties.” This makes it clear that the
contractual relationship is viewed strictly under the Shari'a and

29. See generally N. Saleh, The Law Governing Contracts in Arabia, 38
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 761 (1989); Describing the concept of a contract in Islamic
society. The list of specifications in the Qur'an covering commerce is long: it
includes contracts, the necessity of their certainty, the central importance of
ethics, the strict requirements of honouring one's obligations, of putting them in
writing, the importance of trade, in addition to the famous sentence in the
second chapter explaining how trade has been allowed by God, but riba (interest,
usury) forbidden. “Honour your contracts,” v:1, xvii:34; “put your debts in
writing,” ii:282, “woe to the fraudsters,” lxxxiii:1; “God has allowed commerce
and prohibited riba,” ii:275. C. Mallat, Commercial Law in the Middle East:
Between Classical Transactions and Modern Business, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 81,
91 (2000).
30. QUR'AN 5:1; see also QUR'AN 16:91. See, THE HOLY QU’RAN:
TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY (A. Yusuf Ali trans., American Trust
Publication 2d ed. 1977).
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clearly would disapprove of the “efficient breach” theory.31
Indeed, all contractual obligations32 must be specifically
performed, unless it would contravene the Shari'a or some
legitimate public policy devised in conformity with the Shari'a.33
This approach is manifested in contemporary legislation in much
of the Muslim world.34 The practical effect is that a contract is
enforceable if it is not contrary to Islamic norms.35
Although it is not supported by an express sanction from God,
Louisiana law, like any other legislation following the French
model of the Code Napoléon, takes a very similar approach to the
sanctity of contract. Louisiana Civil Code article 1983 provides
that “[c]ontracts have the effect of law between the parties and
may be dissolved only through the consent of the parties or on
grounds provided by law.” Like Islamic law, Louisiana law allows
a person to contract with another for any reason or ‘cause,’ unless
that reason is unlawful because performing the contract would
produce a result that is illegal or against public policy.36 Thus,
Louisiana takes an equally strict view toward contractual
31. S.H. AMIN, COMMERCIAL LAW OF IRAN 64-65 (1986). (Explaining that
the Shari'a views a breach of contract as a religious breach; thus, it is a very
serious matter).
32. See generally J.N. Anderson & N.J. Coulson, The Muslim Ruler and
Contractual Obligations, 33 N.Y.U. L. REV. 917, 923-28 (1958); S. Habachy,
Property, Right, and Contract in Muslim Law, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 450, 458-72
(1962); S.E. RAYNER, THE THEORY OF CONTRACTS IN ISLAMIC LAW: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE MODERN
LEGISLATION IN KUWAIT, BAHRAIN AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 91-100
(1991); F.E. VOGEL & S.L. HAYES III, ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE: RELIGION,
RISK AND RETURN 67-68, 97-102 (1998); M. Zahraa, Negotiating Contracts in
Islamic and Middle Eastern Laws, 13 ARAB. L.Q. 265, 274-77 (1998).
33. AMIN, supra note 31, at 64.
34. See e.g., Egyptian Code Civil art. 89 (1958). (“[A] contract is created,
subject to any special formalities that may be required by law for its conclusion,
from the moment that two persons have exchanged two concordant intentions.”).
Similar provisions are contained in the legislation of other Middle Eastern
nations. See N. Majeed, Good Faith and Due Process: Lessons from the
Shari'a, 20 ARB. INT'L 97, 103-04 (2004).
35. For example, the position in Saudi Arabia is derived from the Hanbali
jurist Ibn Taymiya, who wrote, “The rule in contracts and provisions is that
anything is permitted which is valid and that only that which is forbidden or set
aside by one of the text or the ‘Qiyas' (reasoning by analogy) is forbidden.”
Mallat, supra note 29.
36. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1967-68 (2009).
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relationships; the only practical difference being that Louisiana
does not give contracts a sacred or religious effect.
A. Good Faith
The duty to act in good faith is the essence of Islamic contract
law. But over and above good faith, there is extensive legal
scholarship elaborating clear principles of Islamic contract law. In
fact, commentators have highlighted the inherent flexibility in
Islamic law that allows it to accept modern transactions. Indeed,
“the principle of pacta sunt servanda . . . is recognized by all
Muslim jurist-theologians.”37 Clearly the emphasis on the notion
of freedom of contract and the stress on good faith are in line with
Western conceptions. At the same time, the sanctity of contracts38
37. M. KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM 204 (1955).
38. Similar reverence for the ideal of sanctity of agreements (covenants),
designed to provide a secure transactional framework, informs all schools of
Islamic jurisprudence: In fact, under traditional Islamic (sharia) law, there is a
much stronger presumption than in most legal systems for leaving the
contractually formalized bargain undisturbed. This is in accordance with the.
Chapter (sura) 5 of the Qur'an, sometimes called the Chapter of Contracts
(Surat al-Uqud), begins “with an appeal to fulfil, as sacred, all obligations,
human and divine . . .”
In defining obligation, Ali wrote:
The Arabic word implies so many things that a whole chapter of
Commentary can be written on it. First, there are the divine obligations
that arise from our spiritual nature and our relation to Allah . . . But in
our own human and material life we undertake mutual obligations
express and implied. We make a promise; we enter into a commercial
or social contract; we enter into a contract of marriage; we must
faithfully fulfil all obligations in all these relationships. Our group or
our State enters into a treaty; every individual in that group or State is
bound to see that as far as lies in his power, such obligations are
faithfully discharged.
THE HOLY QU’RAN, supra note 30, at 276 n.682.
This is particularly so, because a large number of transnational transactions
(for example, oil and mineral concessions, production sharing projects, joint
ventures, transfer of technology, construction and operation of public utilities as
well as loan and other financing agreements), on which the economy of the
Western world so vitally depends, have been the subject-matter of many
international commercial disputes and arbitrations. These have in turn involved
an interplay of the notions of fairness with the Islamic veneration of the
stipulations voluntarily inserted by the parties, that is, ufu bil uqud (honor your
contracts). See generally P.N. Kourides, The Influence of Islamic Law on
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in Islamic law and the public policy regarding which contracts are
void and unenforceable may produce results that differ from
Louisiana.
Under the pure doctrine of caveat emptor, the buyer is afforded
the opportunity to examine the goods to be purchased to ensure
the goods are free from defects). As a result, the seller is not
obliged to disclose the item’s defects; hence, let the buyer beware.
In Islamic law, the pre-contractual stage is known as Musawama,
“talks or bargaining,” and is based on the principle of good faith
and fair dealings.39 During this stage of letter exchanges and
drafting of future contracts, Islamic law limits some freedoms of
contract that are familiar in Louisiana.40 For example, in Louisiana
a party can freely withdraw from contractual negotiations until he
accepts a binding agreement.41 In contrast, Islamic law provides
for compensation under certain circumstances when one party
breaks off negotiations.42 Additionally, Muslims under the
Islamic law are less free to determine the terms of their
agreements.43 They are limited by such principles as riba,44

Contemporary Middle Eastern Legal Systems: The Formation and Binding
Force of Contracts, 9 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 384 (1970).
39. D. Elkarkouri, “Pre-Contractual Liability in Islamic Construction
Contracts,” INT. CONST. L. REV. 545-6 (1992).
40. See THE CONFERENCE ON COMPARATIVE LINKS BETWEEN ISLAMIC LAW
AND THE COMMON LAW, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1 (1986); see also for a more
complete reference C. Chehata, Islamic Law, in 2 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 138-142 (1976); and H. Afchar, The
Muslim Conception of Law, in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW, 84-106 (1976).
41. This rule also prevails in most common law countries. See generally
P.N. Kourides, The Influence of Islamic Law on Contemporary Middle Eastern
Legal Systems: The formation and Binding force of contracts, 2 COLUM. J.
TRANS’L L. 384 (1970).
42. Elkarkouri, supra note 39, at 546.
43. S.E. RAYNER, THE THEORY OF CONTRACTS IN ISLAMIC LAW: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE MODERN
LEGISLATION IN KUWAITI, BAHRAIN, AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 23
(1991).
44. Riba (lit. increase) any increase in a loan or sale transaction which
accrues to the lender, seller or buyer, without the provision of an equivalent
counter-value to the other party. Riba encompasses various types of illicit gain,
of which banking interest is one example. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ISLAM,
supra note 18.
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gharar45 or any other Sharia restrictions.46
Like under Islamic law, good faith is considered the foundation
of all obligations under Louisiana law, especially contractual
obligations. For instance, Louisiana Civil Code article 1759
provides that “[g]ood faith shall govern the conduct of the obligor
and the obligee in whatever pertains to the obligation.”47 Article
1983 then places good faith at the basis of the contractual
relationship as “[c]ontracts must be performed in good faith.”
However, for good faith to apply, there must be at least a preexisting obligation. As yet, there is no general obligation under
Louisiana law to negotiate in good faith. As a result, Louisiana
courts have been unwilling to use the good faith principle to
impose a pre-contractual duty of disclosure. Thus, good faith has a
much more limited role in Louisiana than in Islamic law, having
effect only after a contract or obligation has come into existence.
B. A Duty of Disclosure and a Common Idea of Defects
Islamic law has both jurisprudential and codal duties of
disclosure. In Islamic jurisprudence, the idea of disclosure is
embodied in the Khiyar or option. The option literally allows a
party, under certain circumstances, to unilaterally decide whether
to rescind or uphold a contract.48 Within the realm of disclosure
45. Gharar is uncertainty in a contract of exchange as to the existence of the
subject matter of the contract and deliverability, quantity, or quality of the
subject matter. It also involves contractual ambiguity as to the consideration
and the terms of the contract. Such ambiguity will render most contracts void.
There are a number of Hadith that forbid trading in gharar, often giving specific
examples of gharhar transactions (e.g., selling the birds in the sky or the fish in
the water, the catch of the diver, an unborn calf in its mother’s womb, the sperm
and unfertilized eggs of camels, etc.). K.M. Kahn, Juristic Classification of
Islamic Law, 6 HOU. J. INT’L L. 23, 23-25 (1983). Contrast this with the
aleatory contracts in Louisiana, such as the sale of a hope: “Thus, a fisherman
may sell a haul of his net before he throws it. In that case the buyer is entitled to
whatever is caught in the net, according to the parties' expectations, and even if
nothing is caught the sale is valid.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 2451 (2009).
46. It is very interesting to consider the parallel with another religion
oriented legal system. See J.R. Wagner, Islamic and Talmudic Jurisprudence:
The Four Roots of Islamic Law and Their Talmudic Counterparts, 1 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 25 (1982).
47. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1759 (2007) (emphasis added).
48. Center of Muslim-Jewish Engagement at University of Southern
California,
Vol.
3,
Book
34,
Num.
322,
available
at
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duties, there are two types of options: the option for defect (Khiyar
al-ayb) and the option of inspection (Khiyar al’Ru’yyah). These
options are available to buyers in sales contracts, as well as in
other commutative contracts and function as an implied warranty
against defects.49 The option of defect is “a right given to a
prospective purchaser to revoke or to accomplish a contract
because of a defect discovered in the subject matter.”50 Or, as
stated by an Islamic jurist, “A purchaser has a right of option on
account of defects in the thing bought, of which he has become
aware only after taking possession, but which existed
previously.”51 This option is established without stipulation. When
a person purchases a good with a defect, no matter if it is trivial or
flagrant,52 he may retain the object at its full price or reject it, but
http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/ha
dith/bukhari/034.sbt.html (last visited on September 20, 2009). Narrator Ibn
'Umar states:
Allah's Apostle said, “The seller and the buyer have the option of
cancelling or confirming the deal unless they separate, or one of them
says to the other, 'Choose (i.e. decide to cancel or confirm the bargain
now).” Perhaps he said, 'Or if it is an optional sale.'”Ibn Umar, Shuraih,
Ash-Shabi, Tawus, Ata, and Ibn Abu Mulaika agree upon this
judgment.
The Prophet said, “The buyer and the seller have the option to cancel or
confirm the bargain before they separate from each other or if the sale is
optional.” Nafi said, “Ibn 'Umar used to separate quickly from the seller if he
had bought a thing which he liked.” Id. at n. 320.
AL MUWATTA, supra note 71, no. 31.38.79 at 272. “Yahya related to me
from Malik from Nafi’ from ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Umar that the Messenger of Allah,
may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, “Both parties in a business
transaction have the right of withdrawal as long as they have not separated,
except in the transaction called khiyar.” Malik said, “There is no specified limit
nor any matter which is applied in this case according to us.”
49. A.Q. ZUBAIR, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC LAW OF CONTRACT 122 (1991).
50. Id. at 137.
51. M.M. Billah, Caveat Emptor versus Khiyar Al-Aib, a Dichotomy, 13
ARAB. L. Q. 278 (1998).
52. N.E. BAILLIE, THE MOOHUMUNDAN LAW OF SALE, ACCORDING TO THE
HUNEEFEEA CODE: FROM THE FUTAWA ALUMGEREEREE, A DIGEST OF THE
WHOLE LAW 99 (1975). Defines a flagrant defect the one that happens if two
valuators agree that the defect lowered the value of the item purchased. “. . . On
the other hand, when one of them insists that the thing is still worth what the
other alleges to be its full value in a perfect state, though he maintains its present
worth to be somewhat less, the defect is said to be slight or trivial.” From page
100 to 119 Baille refers of a list of defects in the slaves and animals similar to
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he cannot retain it and seek for compensation for the defect.53 A
defect is any cause that lowers the value of the object, according to
the custom of experienced merchants and the like.54 Additionally,
Islamic law gives a party the option of pleading defect regardless if
the buyer was ignorant of the defect when he concluded the
contract.55 The general principle of the Khiyar al-‘aib provides the
exercise of option in a way that the buyer might uphold the
contract or rescind it by giving the defective goods back to the
seller without the right to seek any compensation.56
Aib means a defect or a fault impairing the value of a contract.
Had it been known, the contract would not have been concluded.
Therefore, the agreement is not valid and the deceived party has
the right to rescind the contract. Any party can rescind the contract
by a Khiyar without recourse to a court.
As a corollary, a seller is under an absolute duty to correctly
and honestly disclose known latent defects, a duty which is based
on the ban against providing erroneous information that causes
material loss.57 Indeed, in article 336 of the Mejella, which is a
the list included in the Digest: it is noteworthy to stress how two so distant legal
worlds (Islam and Latin) faced the same problems. This inquiry, even if
fascinating, is too broad for the scope of this work.
53. Id. at 98.
54. Id. at 100.
55. Id. Considering the right of the buyer to recover for defects if those
defects were present before the period of sale are, by consensus, valid causes for
litigation and recovery. Scholars differed to those that appear during the period
of sale and before the sale are finalized. Malik established that the buyer has
three days to raise the presence of a defect, after which time the claim must be
dropped; while in the case that the defect is of the type that does not appear
except seasonally (or except over a long period of time) he allotted one year. An
example of this would be the sale of an animal with Mange, the mange having
been treated before the sales period but as it is known that without re-treatment
it will reappear. The three day period was substantiated by a hadith (judged
weak by the opposing opinion) and the period of one year was affirmed by
precedent found in the custom of the people of Medina. This application may be
viewed as similar to the principle of caveat emptor in English Common Law,
although not synonymous.
56. S.C. SIRCAR, AL-SHARI’S: SUNNO & IMAMIA CODES 496 (2006).
57. Elkarkouri, supra note 39, at 545. Under pre-contractual law, Islamic
jurists made an important distinction between cases where pre-purchased
merchandise is delivered for examination and cases where merchandise is
delivered for agreement on a purchase price. In the former situation, the risk of
defective merchandise is on the sender, especially in cases where the price is not
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complete code on Islamic law dated of year 1876 and connected
with the Ottoman Empire, there is an implied warranty that the
thing sold should be free from any defect: “A sale, without any
stipulation, makes it necessary that the thing sold should be free
from defect.”58 In article 339, the Mejella clarifies this point,
stating that “an ancient defect is a fault which existed in the thing
sold when it was in the hands of the seller.”59 This duty to disclose
exists regardless of whether the parties to the agreement have
between them any fiduciary relationship or whether the
disclosure60 of such defects was requested by the seller. Thus,
when the seller violates this duty, the injured party has the option
to rescind the contract.61 This idea is buttressed by the Holy
Tradition, according to which it is illegal for a seller to sell a thing
if he knows that it has a defect, unless the seller informs the buyer
of that defect.62 In addition, Muhammad warned against selling
goods if defects were not disclosed: “if anyone sells a defective
article without drawing attention to it, he will remain under God’s
anger, or the Angels will continue to curse him.”63
Like its common and civil law counterparts, exercise of the
khiyar al-‘aib is subject to several conditions. First, the defect in
the goods must exist before the goods are given to the buyer.64
Notice that the risk of loss passes with possession. For instance,
Article 340 of the Mejella provides that a defect that arises after

yet fixed. In the second situation, the risk of defective goods is on the buyer.
Even if an Islamic court ensures that parties abide by the terms of the contract,
the court would not compensate a party for damages a mere mistake causes.
Under the principles of Sharia, victims cannot recover damages where the
mistake is exclusive.
Additionally, Islamic law does not grant any
compensation for breaking off negotiations or for the loss of expectation
interests.
58. THE MEJELLE, BEING AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF MAJALLAHELAHKAM-I-ADLIYA AND A COMPLETE CODE ON ISLAMIC CIVIL LAW 48, art. 336
(Tyser et al. trans., 1980) (1901) (Hereinafter THE MEJELLE).
59. “An ancient defect is a fault, which existed in the thing sold, when it
was in the hands of the seller.” Id. at 49, art. 339.
60. A. Strudler, Moral Complexity in the Law of Nondisclosure, 45 UCLA
L. REV. 337 (1997).
61. Elkarkouri, supra note 39, at 547.
62. BILLAH, supra note 51, at 287.
63. Id. (quoting Ibn. Mayah).
64. Id. at 99.
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the sale but before delivery, while the thing is in the hands of the
seller, is a ground for rescission.65 In other words, the seller is
liable for all defects that arise before delivery of the goods to the
buyer, even if the goods were in perfect or merchantable condition
when the contract was concluded.66
In addition to the timing of the defect, in order to profit from
the protection the buyer must not be aware of the defects in the
goods.67 This idea is connected with the option for inspection.
The buyer must have an opportunity to inspect the goods, but if he
becomes aware of the defect and still concludes the contract, he
has tacitly waived his option to rescind. Also, the buyer cannot
exempt the seller from liability through an express stipulation.68
Finally, the defect must have existed at the time the buyer
exercised the option.69
The buyer loses his right of option even if the goods are
discovered to be defective in the following situations. First, if the
seller tells the buyer (or otherwise gives him notice) that there is a
defect in the goods.70 This is a counterpoint of the Islamic laws
duty of disclosure. Since the seller has an absolute duty to disclose
the defects in the product he is selling, when he discloses those
defects, the buyer having bought with knowledge has no option to
rescind the contract. Second, a seller has no liability for defects in
his goods when he stipulates with the buyer that he will have no
such liability.71 Nevertheless, if the seller knows of the defects in
65. THE MEJELLE, supra note 58, art. 340 at 49. The meaning of rescission
in the Islamic contract law is a broad one; it encompasses the contract voidable
and the contract valid but not binding. M.A. BAHARUM, MISREPRESENTATION: A
STUDY OF ENGLISH AND ISLAMIC CONTRACT LAW 285 (1986).
66. W.F. Fratcher, Uses of Uses, 34 MO. L. REV. 39, 39 (1969).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. S.R. RAYNER, THE THEORY OF CONTRACT IN ISLAMIC LAW: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE MODERN
LEGISLATION IN KUWAITI, BAHRAIN, AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 331
(1991).
70. “If a seller, at the time of the sale, shews a defect in the thing sold, and
the buyer accepts with that defect, he cannot have an option on account of that
defect.” THE MEJELLE, supra note 58, at 49, art. 341.
71. “When a seller sells a property with a condition that he is to be free
from claims for all defects, there is no option for defect for the buyer.” THE
MEJELLE, supra note 58, at 49, art. 342.
See also IMAN MALIK IBN ANAS, AL MUWATTA OF IMAM MALIK IBN ANAS
248 (Aisha Abdurrahman Bewley Trans., 1989). (Hereinafter AL MUWATTA).
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his goods and purposely stipulates with the buyer to protect
himself from that defect, the stipulation in null. He who sells (with
an exemption clause for the defects of the goods) will not be
responsible for any defect unless he knew and purposely concealed
it, the earlier exemption clause shall have no effect and he (the
seller) shall still be responsible for the defects.72
Thirdly, the seller is not liable for defects if, after the contract
is concluded, the buyer agrees to be deemed solely liable for such
defects.73 Fourthly, if the buyer consciously accepts the defects of
the goods, the seller is exculpated from liability.74 Likewise, the
seller is absolved from liability if the buyer knows of the defect75
and exercises ownership over the goods in any of the following
ways: (1) eating any portion of the goods;76 (2) keeping the goods
in his possession for a reasonable period of time; (3) repairing or
demolishing any part of the goods; or (4) disposing of the goods.77
Finally, the seller is not liable if the defects occurred in the hands
of the buyer.78
In the Islamic legal system, two principles coexist. The seller
must disclose the defects in the goods he is selling. The buyer
must also inspect the goods (interpreted as a right and also as a
duty) as a sort of cooperative activity in the sale. Once the goods
have been scrutinized, the Islamic solution focuses on the
simplification of the transaction. In fact, the buyer has the right of
option either to continue or to rescind the contract before or after
the conclusion of the sale and purchase agreement with the aim of
ensuring the quality of the goods.79
72. AL MUWATTA, supra note 71, at 249.
73. “If there’s a property saying ‘it is accepted with all defects,’ there is no
longer a right of action for defect.” THE MEJELLE, supra note 58, art. 343 at 49.
For example, if a buyer purchases an animal stating it is accepted even if blind,
lame and unsound or worthless maybe return it on the ground that it has an old
defect.
74. RAYNER, supra note 69, at 340.
75. BAILLE, supra note 52, at 105.
76. K. BHAVAN, THE HEDAYA: COMMENTARY ON THE ISLAMIC LAWS, 2, at
415 (Charles Hamilton trans., 1985). (Hereinafter THE HEDAYA).
77. “If the purchaser dispose of the thing sold, in a manner, which is an
exercise of the right of ownership in it, after he knows of a defect in it, he has
destroyed his option for the defect.” THE MEJELLE, supra note 58, art. 344 at 49.
78. See AL MUWATTA, supra note 71, no 31.4 at 249.
79. As it has already been pointed out the common law grants the right to
inquire the goods only before the conclusion of the contract.
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Louisiana, following the civil law tradition is very protective of
purchasers when the things they buy contain some sort of flaw or
defect. Because of this increased concern for protecting buyers,
Louisiana extensively uses the duty to disclose in the context of
redhibitory defects. The seller’s obligation to provide an implied
warranty is established in several code articles. First, article 2475
provides that “the seller is bound . . . to warrant to the buyer
ownership and peaceful possession of, and the absence of hidden
defects in, that thing. The seller also warrants that the thing sold is
fit for its intended use.”80 Pursuant to Civil Code article 2520,
“[t]he seller warrants the buyer against redhibitory defects, or
vices, in the thing sold.”81 That article goes on further to explain
that a defect is redhibitory in three situations: (1) where the defect
renders the thing useless; (2) where the defect renders the thing so
inconvenient that it can be presumed that the buyer would not have
purchased it if he had known of the defect; and (3) the defect
diminishes the purchased item’s usefulness so that the buyer would
have only purchased it at a lesser price.82
Louisiana creates a duty on the seller to disclose any defects
through the imposition of heightened remedies for the purchaser.
For instance, if a seller does not know of the defect in the thing
sold, Civil Code article 2531 allows him several options. First, the
seller has the right to repair the thing, and it is only when he cannot
or refuses to do so that he will be liable for a return of the purchase
price.83 In addition, the seller will have to pay interest starting
from the time that the price was paid as well as reimburse the
buyer for sales expenses and perseveration costs.84 Finally, a seller
in this context has a right to have his liability to the buyer reduced
by the use that the buyer made of the thing.85
Contrast the remedies listed above with those afforded to a
buyer when the seller is in bad faith (i.e., knew of the defect in the
thing sold). To begin with, the seller in this context has no right to
80. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2475 (2007). This article is similar to the
concept contained in the English Sale of Goods Act of 1979, which contains
both a warranty of quality or fitness as well as a warranty of description. Sale of
Goods Act, 1979, 2, §§ 13-14 (Eng.).
81. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2520 (2007).
82. Id.
83. See id. at art. 2531.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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repair the defective product and is immediately liable for a return
of the purchase price.86 In addition to being responsible for the
buyer’s reasonable sales and preservation expenses, the seller will
also have to pay damages and attorney’s fees.87 Finally, the seller
has no right to seek a reduction in his liability for the value of the
buyer’s use of the defective thing. This ability to reduce his
liability is left to the sole discretion of the court.88
The buyer’s ability to recover damages against a bad faith seller
is of significant importance. Pursuant to Louisiana’s general
contract rules, non-pecuniary damages (mental anguish) can only
be recovered in two circumstances: (1) when the contract is
intended to gratify a non-pecuniary interest and the obligor either
knew or should have known that his failure to perform would
cause non-pecuniary damage and (2) when regardless of the nature
of the contract, the obligor breached the contract with the intent of
aggrieving the obligee’s feelings.89 Nevertheless, Louisiana courts
have allowed buyers to recover non-pecuniary damages in the
context of redhibition, even if the claim does not meet the general
contractual standards for non-pecuniary loss.
For instance, in Bourne v. Rein Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,90 the
plaintiff was allowed to recover mental anguish damages after
buying a defective automobile from a dealership.91 The plaintiff
claimed that the seller failed to disclose any mechanical defects in
the car.92 After the car was purchased it began to act sluggish and
the engine frequently died.93 Subsequently, the horn began to
spontaneously activate and the engine began to race.94 In addition,
the door panel fell off and the vinyl roof began to bubble up.95 The
cruise control then broke and a portion of the engine became
disconnected and created a hole in the hood.96 Finally, the air

86. See id. at art. 2545.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1998 (2007).
90. 463 So. 2d 1356 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985).
91. Id. at 1361.
92. Id. at 1357.
93. Id. at 1357-58.
94. Id. at 1357.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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conditioner broke and flooded the interior of the car with water.97
To add insult to the plaintiff’s injury, her frequent trips to the
repair shop invoked taunting and laughter by the service
personnel.98
The court deviated from the general, strict
requirements for the recovery of non-pecuniary damages99 and
found that when a seller delivers a defective product it creates not
only contractual but also delictual liability.100 Therefore, the court
allowed the plaintiff to recover for her emotional damage as well
as her contractual redhibition claim without instituting another
action in tort.
Nevertheless, Louisiana stands by the notion, even in its
articles on redhibition, that it will not save a buyer from a bad
bargain. Thus, pursuant to Civil Code article 2521, a seller is not
liable to the buyer for any defects which are either made known
(disclosed) or “should have been discovered by a reasonably
prudent buyer.”101 Therefore, if the defect is such that the buyer
should have discovered it with a reasonable inspection, the law
will afford him no remedy and it will relieve the seller of any duty
to disclose.102
The importance of Louisiana’s use of redhibition to create a
duty of disclosure in sales cannot be overstated. Whereas general
Louisiana contract theory does not always require the seller to
disclose his knowledge about the thing sold, the state’s law of
redhibition steps up to fill the gap. Thus, through the imposition of
increased liability on the part of a seller who knew the item being
sold contained a defect and failed to disclose it, Louisiana creates a
duty of disclosure that provides an extreme sense of protection to
purchasers.

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1360.
100. Id. at 1359-60 (citing Phillippe v. Browning Arms Co., 395 So. 2d 310
(La. 1981)).
101. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2521 (2007).
102. This is not a deviation from the civil law tradition, according to which
the guarantee arises only for hidden defects (the buyer should show some care in
buying: the so called principle of auto-responsibility). In many legislations there
are provisions excluding the remedy for obvious/apparent defects (but the seller
is liable if he expressed some appreciation on the soundness of the good, or if he
hid the defect).
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IV. THE VICES OF CONSENT
A. The Louisiana Perspective
Louisiana does not have a general duty to disclose. In that
sense, it is no different than any of the forty-nine other American
states.
Louisiana does, however, create specific duties of
disclosure in certain instances. The formation of consent is the
first place Louisiana courts have found a specific duty of
disclosure. More specifically, Louisiana’s law on error and fraud
overlap, so that when a person knows another is contracting under
an error, it is very possible that the requirements of fraud may be
met. It is in this gray area where the laws of fraud and error
intertwine that Louisiana creates a contract law based duty of
disclosure.
In Louisiana, error and fraud are seen as vitiating, or creating a
defect in, consent; nevertheless, a contract based on either error or
fraud still produces some legal effects.103 Pursuant to civil code’s
article 1949, error vitiates consent only if the following two
elements are met: (1) the error concerns a cause without which the
obligation would not have been incurred104 and (2) the other party
103. According to theory, error should prevent a contract from ever coming
into existence. However, such a rule totally disregards the reality of business
practice; therefore, in an effort to inject stability in transactions, Louisiana law
views error as a reason for allowing a party to get out of a contract instead of the
prevention of the contracts formation. Id.
104. The first requirement, when an error concerns a cause, is governed
expressly by the code. Pursuant to article 1950, an error concerns a cause in five
different situations: (1) when it bears on the nature of the contract; (2) when it
bears on the thing that is the object of the contract or a substantial quality of the
contractual object; (3) when it bears on either the person, or a substantial quality
of the other party; (4) when it bears on the law; or (5) when it bears on any other
circumstances that the parties either actually or should have regarded in good
faith as the cause. LA CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1950 (2007). It bears noting that this
formulation is almost exactly the same as the Italian rules governing when a
mistake is considered essential. Note, however, that having an error fall into one
of the categories is necessary but not determinative of the issue. The party in
error must still show that they would not have contracted had they not been in
error; this is a heavier burden than just that they would have contracted on
different terms. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1950 cmt. (g) (2007). See also Litvinoff,
Vices of Consent, Error, Fraud, Duress and Epilogue of Lesion, 50 LA. L. REV.
1, 12-13 (1989). In addition, there are specific cases where the party will not be
allowed to take advantage of his error regardless of whether it meets the
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either knew or should have known of that cause.105 Professor
Litvinoff describes error as creating an impairment that “results
from a sort of accident that takes place in a person’s subjective
process of assembling an act of volition,”106 or more specifically,
“a false or inexact idea that a party to a contract has of an element
of that contract.”107
Pursuant to article 1950, the first requirement for error, that
concerns the principle cause, is met if the error:
[B]ears on the nature of the contract, or the thing that is the
contractual object or a substantial quality of that thing, or
the person or the qualities of the other party, or the law, or
any other circumstances that the parties regarded, or should
in good faith have regarded, as a cause of the obligation.108
The second requirement, that the non-mistaken party either knows
or should have known of the cause, is an objective reasonableness
test, determined on the facts and circumstances of each individual
case.
If the error is one that concerns the principle cause, it is very
likely that the circumstances will be such that each party will
know, by evaluating the circumstances, the principle cause behind

elements: these situations include transactions or compromise made and based
an error of law and payment of a civil obligation when the party was only bound
by a natural obligation. LA. CIV. CODE art 1950 cmt. (h) (2007).
105. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1949 (2007). See also Litvinoff, supra note
104, at 12. A distinction should be made with respect to the non-mistaken
party’s knowledge: it is not knowledge of the error that is important in
determining that consent is vitiated, it is the knowledge of the cause itself- the
reason why the party obligated himself. The non-mistaken party’s knowledge of
the error only becomes important in the determination of who pays damages.
See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1952 (2007).
106. Litvinoff, supra note 104, at 6. Error is basically a situation in which a
party to a contract is acting under a false sense of reality. Id.
107. S. LITVINOFF, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN THE LOUISIANA
JURISPRUDENCE 234 (5th ed. 2000).
108. Surprisingly, this is very similar to the English common law’s notion
of a “fundamental mistake,” which is defined as a mistake “as to the substance
of the whole consideration . . . going . . . to the whole root of the matter.” G.H.
TREITEL, AN OUTLINE OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 100 (4th ed. 1989) (1975).
For a more in-depth discussion of what types of mistakes are considered
fundamental in the English Common Law, see S.A. SMITH, ATIYAH’S
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 172-175 (6th ed. 2005) (1961).
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the other’s consent. In these situations, the test will be met
because objectively the circumstances allowed the parties to know
each other’s principal reason for contracting. However, this is not
always the case, and in some circumstances a party may have a
particular subjective reason for binding himself. In those instances
it would be necessary for that party to take steps to inform the
other party of his unique principal cause; otherwise, the right claim
of operative error will be lost.
For instance, in Bordelon v. Kopicki, a Louisiana appellate
court refused to rescind a contract for the sale of a house based on
the buyer’s unilateral error.109 The purchasers’ principal cause for
binding themselves to buy the house was to convert it into a larger
four bedroom home; the problem was that they did not tell the
seller what they had in mind.110 A short time before the sale was
to close, the purchasers discovered that the house could not be
converted into a four bedroom home because of a right of way held
by the city; thus, unsurprisingly, they refused to buy and conclude
the actual sale.111 The court stated that the apparent, objective
reason for the purchase was for the buyers to get a suitable
home.112 The seller was neither made aware of nor should he be
presumed to have been aware of the buyer’s purpose of converting
the home.113 Thus, the seller had no way of knowing that the
servitude would affect the buyers’ consent, so the requirements of
article 1950 were not met and consent was not vitiated—no
operative error.114
As stated above, there is no general duty of disclosure in
Louisiana, so merely meeting the requirements for error will not
create any duties of disclosure between the parties. This is shown
by looking at article 1952, which states that a party who has a
contract rescinded based on his own error is liable to the non-

109. 524 So. 2d 848 (La. App. 3d. Cir. 1988).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 849.
113. Id.
114. Professor Ronald Scalise sees this case in a somewhat different light.
He thinks that because the servitude was recorded in the public records, the
buyer has constructive knowledge. Therefore, the buyers lost because their error
was inexcusable. This is definitely a valid reading of this case. However, the
court did not discuss either the public records doctrine or duties of disclosure.
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mistaken party for any loss sustained.115 Obviously the law would
not allow a non-mistaken party to recover damages if he violated a
duty he owed to the party in error. Thus, Louisiana’s error rules do
not in and of themselves create disclosure requirements.
Disclosure requirements in Louisiana begin to emerge when
the non-mistaken party’s actions start to approach the level of
fraud. In fact, as alluded to earlier, there is quite a bit of overlap
between Louisiana’s rules of fraud and error. Louisiana defines
fraud as “a misrepresentation or suppression of the truth made with
the intention either to obtain an unjust advantage for one party or
to cause a loss or inconvenience to the other.”116 But more
importantly, “fraud may also result from silence or inaction.”117 It
is this silence or inaction language that is at the heart of
Louisiana’s pre-contractual duty of disclosure.
It is common knowledge that silence or inaction does not
always constitute fraud. Louisiana is no exception to this rule; it
does, however, uniformly punish a party who remains silent when
he knows the other is acting under an error, just under different
sets of rules. For instance, when one party knows another party is
operating under an error and remains silent and that silence is not
fraudulent, Louisiana sanctions him by denying him the right to
recover damages when the contract is rescinded for error.
Specifically, article 1952 states that in such a circumstance, the
non-mistaken party is barred from recovering damages from the
other party’s error if he “knew or should have known of the
error.”118 Thus, for non-fraudulent non-disclosures, Louisiana
does not create an express, positive duty of disclosure but does
impose a negative sanction.
The sanction contained in article 1952 presupposes that if a
party knows another is operating under an error there is something
wrong with not bringing it to his attention. This presupposition is
not new; in civil law, if a person had knowledge that another party
115. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1952 (2007) (emphasis added). One of the
main factors that go into both the court’s decision of whether or not to rescind
the contract and whether it will award the non-mistaken party damages is
whether the error is excusable. LA CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1952 cmt. (d) (2007).
Thus, if the buyer makes an error which is based on his own negligence, the
court will be very hostile to his claim for rescission.
116. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1953 (2007).
117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1952 (2007) (emphasis added).
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was making an error at the time the contract was formed, he is
guilty of fraud.119 Obviously, Louisiana does not have such a
broad definition of fraud; however, it recognizes that something is
not right in knowing someone is acting in error and remaining
silent. Louisiana law begins to get interesting when that silence
starts to look fraudulent.
Three things happen when a party knows another is acting in
error and his silence looks like fraud. First, the requirements for an
operative error are lowered.120 Specifically, the error no longer has
to concern the contract’s principal cause, 121 but the lesser standard
of only “a circumstance that has substantially influenced the
contract.”122 Second, the silent party will be liable for damages.123
Damages for fraud include attorney’s fees and so called “bad faith
obligor” damages, which consist not only of the generally allowed
foreseeable damages but also of all damages that are a direct
consequence of the silence, regardless of foreseeability.124 And
third, it is much more likely that the court will find a positive duty
of pre-contractual disclosure. This last item mentioned, obviously,
requires further discussion.

119. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1949 cmt. (d) (2007).
120. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1955 (2007).
121. Louisiana refers to the reason why a party obligates himself as the
“cause” on the contract. See S. Litvinoff, Still Another Look at Cause, 48 La. L.
Rev. 3, 26 (1987). Professor Litvinoff provides an example of an error vitiating
consent with the following hypothetical:
For example, in need of information on a particular subject, a person
may walk into a bookstore and, after advising the attendant of his
interest, buy a book that, in spite of its misleading title, does not deal
with that subject. It is clear in such a case that the reason that prompted
the person to bind himself to pay a price was to obtain a book on a
certain subject and that an error was made concerning the subject
treated in the book he bought. Such an error should entitle that person
to obtain rescission of the contract of sale he made at the bookstore.
On the other hand, if the book actually deals with the subject of his
interest, the purchaser should not be allowed to obtain rescission on
ground of an error in the quality of the paper of that book, as it can be
readily concluded that the quality of the paper was not the reason why
he bought the book.
Litvinoff, supra note 104, at 13.
122. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1955 (2007).
123. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1958 (2007).
124. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1997 (2007).
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A good example of how “fraudulent” looking silence will lead
a Louisiana court to find a pre-contractual duty of disclosure is
evident in C.H. Boehmer Sales Agency v. Russo.125 In Russo, a
partnership was in need of a commercially zoned property to
continue its business.126 The partners were made aware of a piece
of property for sale that was formerly operated as a service station,
but was currently empty and up for sale.127 Unbeknownst to the
partnership, the service station was in a non-commercial zone even
though an iron works operation was located directly across the
street.128 The station itself was zoned “industrial non-conforming,”
which meant that only the service station could be operated on the
property; if the station was either altered or sat unused for six
months, its zoning would convert into purely residential.129 When
the partners inspected the property, they informed the seller that
they would need to alter the building to make it larger.130 The
seller, who knew of the particular zoning issue, failed to disclose
this fact to the partners and accepted $200 in return for the
partners’ option to purchase the property.131
The court rescinded the option contract on the grounds of error.
More importantly, the court held that the seller was under a duty to
disclose the true status of the property to the partners.132 The court
stated that the partners were reasonable in the belief that the
service station was zoned commercial it was across the street from
a commercial operation and was not located in an obvious
residential area.133 That, in conjunction with the fact that they
made their purposes known to the seller, imposed upon him a duty
to disclose the zoning issue to the partners.
Another example of when Louisiana courts found a duty to
disclose is Deutschmann v. Standard Fur Company, Inc. In
Standard Fur, a lady ordered a fur coat made to her
specifications.134 She gave the furrier instructions that the coat be
125. 99 So. 2d 475 (La. App. 1958).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 476.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 476-77.
133. Id.
134. 331 So. 2d 219 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
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made of horizontally running, continuous female furs of the same
width as a sample coat she had been shown.135 The furrier, which
had forty years of experience, failed to inform the buyer that it was
impossible to make a coat pursuant to her specifications.136 As a
result, the lady refused to accept the coat upon delivery because it
was different that what she thought she was going to receive.137
The court rescinded the sale on the grounds of error. Specifically,
the court held that the store was the expert and as such had a duty
to tell the buyer that it could not make the coat in the manner she
specified.138
Both of these cases together shed some light on Louisiana’s
view of pre-contractual duties of disclosure. While there is no
general duty of disclosure, when one party knows that the other is
operating under some error, the courts will take a much closer look
at the situation. At a minimum, if the non-mistaken party knows of
the mistake being made (and of course that mistake meets the error
requirements) and fails to inform the other party of his error, he
will be punished by losing his ability to recover damages when the
However, depending on the
contract is rescinded.139
135. Id.
136. Id. at 221.
137. Id. at 220.
138. Id. at 221.
139. It is vital to understand that the error rules have to be met for this
result, courts have a lot of room to manoeuvre here. For instance, an error in
fair market value of an object is not actionable under the rules of error in
Louisiana. In Dixon v. Bohn, the seller of an automobile was found not to have
a duty to disclose certain information to the buyer. 04-503 (La. App. 5 Cir.
11/30/04); 890 So. 2d 613. The buyer purchased a vehicle for the price of
$20,874.86. Id. at 614. The retail price that was suggested by the manufacturer
was only $17,467.00. Id. Believing that he had been overcharged, the buyer
petitioned the court asking it to award him both damages and attorney’s fees. Id.
The court refused, stating that the purchaser had no cause of action because
there was “no requirement in our law that the seller informs the buyer of the fair
market value of property.” Id. at 615.
This same result was obtained in the context of the sale of an immovable. In
Pioneer Valley Hospital, Inc. v. Elmwood Partners, the court held that the
purchaser of a hospital could not rescind the sale based on the seller’s failure to
disclose the fair market value. 01-453 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/17/01); 800 So. 2d
932, 935-36. The buyers claimed that a restrictive covenant in the sale contract
lowered the fair market value and being that the sellers had been involved in
similar sales in the past knew of the covenant’s effect on the market value. Id. at
934. The court rejected the claim that the sellers had any duty to disclose. Id. at
935-36. The court stated that “as long as all facts bearing on the nature of a
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circumstances, the non-mistaken party may find himself liable for
fraud, which has the effect of lowering the standards necessary for
an error to be operative and allowing for the recovery of attorney
fees and other bad-faith based damages.
Like all things in the realm of law, this is not an absolute rule.
Louisiana courts are not so friendly to persons who just fail to
make reasoned decisions or take reasonable steps necessary to
protect their interests. Parties in contractual negotiations are
working to protect their own interest and obtain the best deal
possible. Thus, as a general rule, failing to provide a party with
information which he should have found by himself does not
constitute fraud.140 This is expressly stated in Civil Code article
1954, which provides, “Fraud does not vitiate consent when the
party against whom the fraud was directed could have ascertained
the truth without difficulty, inconvenience, or special skill.”141

property are disclosed, the effect of those facts is left of a buyer to determine.
‘[E]rror as to the value of land, which is the object of the contract, is not error of
fact, but error of judgment, for which the law furnishes no relief.’” Id. at 936.
140. Id. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1954 (2007).
Where the means of knowledge are as hand, and equally available to
both parties, and the subject of purchase is alike open to their
inspection, if the purchaser does not avail himself of these means and
opportunities, he will not be heard to say . . . that he was deceived by
the vendor’s misrepresentations.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1954 cmt. (a) (2007) (citing Rocchi v. Schwabacher &
Hirsch, 33 La.Ann. 1364, 1368 (1881)). Nevertheless, this rule does not apply
when there is some special relationship of confidence among the parties and
because of such a relation a person is induced to relay on the others
representations. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1954 cmt. (b) (2007).
141. Louisiana courts will, however, punish a person when their “failure to
inform or to disclose [ ] is a flagrant abuse of the other party’s ignorance.
Litvinoff, supra note 104, at 57. However, if this abuse of ignorance is not
present and the party merely remains silent, there is no duty imposed. Id. at 5758. Professor Litvinoff points out:
[R]eticence . . . does not occur in a void. Strange as it may seem,
silence has a way of exteriorizing itself through the circumstances that
surround it, circumstances that do not consist of an omission, such as
silence, but are positive acts or facts. It is in the light of such
circumstances that silence may appear tainted with fraudulent intent
and therefore becomes fraudulent reticence. Id.
The professor provides the following example and commentary:
Thus, if in the course of negotiations one party states his impression of
the contractual object and asks from the other, “Tell me if I am wrong,”
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The similar jurisprudential based rule that has emerged in the
context of error is called “inexcusable error” and is consistent with
the approach used in fraud.142 Basically, if the party in error did
not take reasonable steps to prevent the mistake, the court will not
save him. While its application is not limited to situations where
someone has failed to speak up when they know another party is
operating under an error, it will act to prevent a court from
imposing any duty of disclosure in those situations. Thus,
inexcusable error is an exception to Louisiana’s willingness to
impose disclosure duties.
The classic Louisiana example of inexcusable neglect is the
case of Watson v. Planter’s Bank.143 In Watson, the plaintiff
contracted with a bank to invest in cotton but did not read the
contract to make sure it reflected his understanding of the terms.144
Unsurprisingly, the contract he signed materially differed from the
agreement he thought he had entered.145 The plaintiff filed an
action in error, asking the court to rescind the agreement and the
court refused.146 In rejecting his claim of error, the court stated, “In
this case the plaintiff has no one but himself to blame for signing
an agreement different from the one which he says he agreed to
make.”147

the other’s silence amounts to an assertion that the asking party is right,
and will constitute fraudulent reticence if the one who remains silent
knows that the other’s impression is false and resorts to silence to
confirm that impression to this own advantage. Courts should enjoy
great discretion is deciding whether a party was under a duty to speak
or to disclose information to the other, and it has been suggested that in
reaching such conclusions the courts should not hold parties to a very
high moral standard beyond what is necessary to see to it that honesty
and decency prevail in legal transactions. Id.
142. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1952 cmt. (d) (2007) (citing 6 PLANIOL ET
RIPERT, TRAITÉ PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS 227-229 (2d ed. Esmein
1952)). For a much more in-depth analysis of inexcusable error in Louisiana,
see Saúl Litvinoff, “Error” in the Civil Law, in ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL LAW OF
OBLIGATIONS 222, 226-269 (Dainow ed. 1969).
143. 22 La. Ann 14 (La. 1870). Watson is not a recent case. In fact, the
money used in the transaction was Confederate treasury notes. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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Overall, Louisiana is not completely averse to using its rules of
conventional obligations, specifically its rules on error and fraud,
to impose duties of disclosure in certain circumstances. It is true
that Louisiana does not have a general duty of disclosure. It is,
also true, however, that a party remains silent at his own risk if he
knows the other party is operating under an error. In such
situations, it is very possible that he will lose the right to recover
damages if the contract is rescinded for error. It is also likely that
if his silence borders upon fraud, he may be found to have violated
a duty of disclosure and thrown into fraud based liability.
B. The Islamic Perspective
The free consent and truthfulness of the parties to a contract is
a moral obligation which underpins the law of Islam relating to
contract. Thus, the consent of the parties to a contract is a basic
requirement of a valid contract that must be given voluntarily and
free from the impediments of error, misrepresentation and fraud. If
one of these impediments is present a contract is voidable because
the full consent is barred. Therefore, the enforceability of a
contract is based on the integrity and genuineness of consent.
Mistake (al-ghalat) is a cause of pollution of this genuineness and
it is defined as “a state of mind that inspires an erroneous
impression or unrealistic imagination.”148 Islamic doctrine divides
the mistakes into two categories: hidden and apparent mistakes.
The hidden mistake is a situation remaining in the mind of a party
making him believe a different reality. For example, the
contracting party does not show his believed and erroneous ideas
about the item he is buying. The hidden mistake cannot invalidate
the contract and the hidden impressions that are not revealed
cannot be considered. Also the apparent mistake regards a
situation of imagination that exists in the mind of a contracting
party but, in this case, it is expressly revealed (the purchaser stated
that he wants to buy a ring made of gold instead he received a ring
of brass). Muslim jurists agree on the avoidance of the contract in
this case.149
The Islamic world does not have a definition of
misrepresentation that can cover all species of misleading conduct
148. ZUBAIR, supra note 49, at 240.
149. Id. at 241-242.

92

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 2

and statements; there is also a lack of systematic approach on the
point.150 Misrepresentation is otherwise defined according the
specific types. It is generally defined as a false assertion of fact,
either by word or conduct, or as the prevention of an existing
defect in the subject-matter from being disclosed, which induces
another to enter into a contract.151
The traditional English classification of misrepresentation as
innocent, negligent and fraudulent is not relevant for the Islamic
world because here the effect of any misrepresentation is the same.
In any case, the way in which the misrepresentation is made is
more important than its effect. So, the classification in Islam
distinguishes between active fraud, false statements, and
concealment of defects of the subject matter (which covers the
contracts uberrimae fidei).152
On the other side, the fact that a party has been induced to enter
into a contract by the misrepresentation of the other contracting
party is not enough to grant the remedy of rescission. Some other
requirements must be fulfilled.

150. A.A. FYZEE, OUTLINES OF MUHAMMADAN LAW 1 (3 ed. 1964)
(1947) states:
Islamic law is not a systematic code: but there is amongst its different
schools a large measure of agreement, because the starting point and
the basic principles are identical. The differences that exist are due to
historical, political, economic and cultural reasons, and it is, therefore,
obvious that this system cannot be studied without a proper regard to its
historical development.
The impossibility to create a parallel between English and Islamic law
derives from the different methods of approach.
Under English law,
misrepresentation vitiates consent and so includes both acts and statements, in so
far as they induce the state of mind of the parties to the contract and renders the
apparent agreement unreal. Islamic law, on the other hand, accepts the apparent
agreement as valid but gives the injured party the option to rescind it. See N.J.
COULSON, COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE GULF STATES: THE ISLAMIC LEGAL
TRADITION 72 (1984).
See generally J. SCHACHT, THE ORIGINS OF MUHAMMADAN JURISPRUDENCE
(1959); A. HASAN, THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 7
(1970).
151. In the traditional Shari’a, the authorities contain only several examples
of fraud which gives the injured party the right to rescind the contract.
BAHARUM, supra note 65, at 54.
152. Id. at 57.
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First of all, the representation must be false. In general there is
no duty to disclose any fact, except that of a known defect153 or, in
the uberrimae fidei contract, all material fact. If such a duty exists,
anything that is less than a full disclosure amounts to a deliberate
concealment and then the representation must be one of fact. The
statements of opinion, the advices, the laudatory or puffing
statements or the ones made jokingly, are irrelevant except when
the promisor says he will bear the responsibility of his promise. A
peculiar feature of the Islamic legal system is that all statements of
law are considered as statements of fact on the basis that all the
Muslims have a duty to know the law, given its holy origin.
Again, what is needed is an inducement, i.e. the contracting party
would have not entered into the contract without the
misrepresentation; if, on the other hand, the deceived party
discovers the misrepresentation and enters the contract regardless,
he cannot invoke rescission but he may have relief under the
option for defects if the thing is defective.154 Furthermore, the
misrepresentation must be operative, i.e. an average man would
have suffered a real misunderstanding. The lack of diligence may
bar the availability of the remedy (it is said that proof that the party
was deceived must be shown in addition to the proof of the
inducement). Terein lies one of the main differences with the
English system: while in common law the inducement is the
decisive factor, in the Islamic legal system the accent is posed on
the diligence of the deceived party in attempting to ascertain the
truth of the fact (according to the standard of an average man). In
this sense, any loss due to this lack of diligence is not recoverable.
Finally, we must consider the deceived party’s injury being
compensated with damages. In the uberrimae fidei contracts and

153. Imam Malik clarified this point saying, “Who sells with an exemption
clause exempting himself (the seller) from liability of any defects of the goods
will be not responsible for that defect unless he knew about it and concealed it.
If the seller knew and concealed the defect, such an exemption clause will not
exempt him from the liability of such defective product.” AL MUWATTA, supra
note 71, no. 31.4 at 249.
154. BAHARUM, supra note 65, at 166. According to the Hanabali school,
the intention to deceive is not taken into account in giving the right of rescission
it is more important to measure the effect of the contract. The contract can be
rescinded if the representee can prove he suffered damages.
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concealment of defect, the proof of the injury is not required. In
such cases the evidence of the existence of fraud is enough.155
The idea of deception (Al-Ghabn) is defined as “a situation
where one of the two considerations in commutative contracts is
unequal in value to another during the construction of the
contract.”156
Al-Ghabn is divided into two kinds: significant and
insignificant. These two kinds are defined in two different ways
according to the schools. The first interpretation defines the
significant Ghabn as the kind that comes under the appraisal of the
experts of the field.157 Another school of thought says that the
Ghabn is significant if the thing sold is worthy more of the 5% of
the price of purchase according to the appraisal of an expert.158 If
the deception is insignificant the contract remains valid. If the
deception is significant we still have two lines of thoughts. The
majority of the jurists (Hanafi and Handbali schools) maintain that
a significant Ghabn impairs the contract and causes an injury and,
therefore, the deceived party has the right to rescind it.159
The Shafi’i school holds that a contract is validly formed and
that commutative contracts upon which the Ghabn insisted are
established and executed ab initio. The granting to the deceived
party of the right to rescind it will destabilize the commercial
transactions. Furthermore, the protection of the contracting parties
from Ghabn is balanced with their duty to take care and precaution.
Zubir said that the deceived party is liable for his failure because
he acted inadvertently, therefore, he alone shall bear the
consequences of his carelessness.160 In conclusion, contracts
which are concluded with concealment of defects, false statements

155. Id. at 85-93.
156. ZUBAIR, supra note 49, at 246. The example, that sounds strange to
the ears of a western jurist, is the sale of a book for one hundred naira when its
market value was of two hundred naira. The vendor, in this case, is the deceived
party. On the other side, the buyer would be the deceived party if he buys for a
higher price compared to the market value.
157. Id. at 246-247.
158. Id. at 247. Specifying that not all the things sold are under the same
percentage rule; the 10% for example is the rate required to be significant
difference of price for the sale of animals.
159. Id. at 248.
160. Id. at 248-249.
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when accompanied with lesio enormis, and active fraud are
considered as voidable contracts.161
If fraud (Al-taghrir), i.e. “the use of fraudulent means to induce
a person to enter into a contract in which he has been made to
believe that it will serve his interest but which in actual fact is
detrimental,”162 is successful (i.e. without the fraud the party would
never have concluded the contract) the victim of the trickery (AlMaghur) has a right to rescind the contract.163 The rescission is
granted even if the Ghabn is insignificant.164
As stated before, it is a general principle that the contracting
parties are not obliged to disclose all the information about the
bargain if the silence of the fact does not mislead the other
contracting party.165 Precisely, silence is allowed on knowledge
related to unimportant facts within the exclusive knowledge of the
party, for instance the original price of the thing sold166 Disclosure
(Katman) is, however, necessary when it is a prerequisite of the
validity of the contract; the two main exceptions are the knowledge
of defects and the contract uberrimae fidei.167 Under Islamic law
reticence on facts is allowed only to the extent that it does not
affect the article’s value or the purpose of the contract.168 For

161. BAHARUM, supra note 65, at 133.
162. ZUBAIR, supra note 49, at 252.
163. Id. at 254.
164. Id. at 255.
165. In the small group of uberrimae fidei contracts in Islamic law (resale
of goods for the exact price originally paid, or with an agreed profit, percentage
or at an agreed discount) the original price paid is essential; so, the seller has the
duty to disclose all the facts that affected the price. COULSON, supra note 150,
at 73.
166. Therefore, the literal truth of the statements is not a defense if they
convey a misleading idea upon the reader. In brief, misleading statements or
advertising depend on the category of person addressed. These liability rules are
the outcome of a religious system that has the aim of protecting moral values. It
is a subjectivity test the one applied to see if the person addressed has been
mislead. Id.
167. In English law the scope of the disclosure is less stringent according to
the maxim of the caveat emptor. Regard to the uberrimae fidei contracts, the
differences with the common law lies only in some details.
168. COULSON, supra note 150, at 72-73. Where is narrated a peculiar case
relates to the disclosure topic. There is an offense called “meeting riders out of
town.” This regards the practice to intercept a caravan which had not reached its
destination. Due to the caravan ignorance of the local prices the tradesman
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example, failing to disclose the color of a car is not a frustration of
the purpose of the contract and it does not affect the car’s value.
The disclosure of defects is required even if the other party
would not have entered into the contract or the acquired knowledge
would have lowered the price because the free consent is one of the
prerequisite for the validity of the contract and the existence of
defects prevents this state of mind. This duty arises during the precontractual stage. Therefore, it is a tortious and non-contractual
claim. This reticence, regarded as fraud, renders the contract void.
The defrauded party may rescind or affirm the contract for the full
price. This option (in the form of khiyar al’-aib or khiyar at tadlis,
i.e. option for fraud) has the purpose to restore the defrauded party
to the position he was in before the contract was made. The
Islamic concept of fraudulent misrepresentation also covers the
deliberate silence of facts which the representor is obliged to
discover, above all the defects on the thing sold.169
The duty to disclose is a moral one and it is not a prerequisite
to invoke the option; the only thing that matters is the existence of
the defect.170 The law of Allah was given to man and society must
adapt itself to the law rather than creating new laws to changing
needs.
The products of the original agrarian society, normally
uncomplicated and produced locally, were dealt with between
could elevate profits. Such activity is condemned as cheating and the injured
party can rescind the contract. Id. A similar case is analyzed by Cicero.
In his work De Officiis, Cicero provides the example of a grain merchant
who had imported a large cargo of grain to Rhodes during a period of severe
famine. Because of the famine, prices had risen to extremely high levels. The
merchant knew that there are other shipments of grain being sent to Rhodes,
having passed them on his voyage. Being an honest man, he is faced with the
dilemma of disclosing the fact that other shipments of grain are coming, and
selling his cargo at a lower price, or withholding the information, and selling his
cargo at a greater profit. Cicero, after analyzing both arguments, concludes that
the information should be disclosed, for otherwise the merchant would be
“shifty, artful, shrewd, underhand, cunning, one grown old in fraud and
subtlety.” Cicero believed in a general duty of disclosure based in a sense of
morality. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, 3 DE OFFICIIS sec. 12, at 319 (Walter
Miller trans. 1913).
169. COULSON, supra note 150, at 65.
170. The defect is not limited, of course, on the value of the good. If A
buys a pair of shoes of a different size he cannot use them and the contract failed
for the purpose even if the value is not lower of what was estimated.
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sellers and buyers on a relative equal arms length. Nowadays the
products become every day more complex, produced far from the
place of the sale and put in the market through adhesion contracts.
This change in trade methods, sophistication of products, and the
increasing amount of quantity and quality in the “things” sold
creates a challenge for the Shari’a, which stopped developing at
the tenth century.171
From a national perspective, legal systems such as the
Egyptian, Syrian, Iraqi, Mauritanian, Morocco and Algerian172
have been receptive to both foreign and customary legal
principles.173 These legal systems followed a movement of
modernization that has occurred in most Islamic countries through
the influence of European law and has gradually separated
commercial law from the Shari'a. This separation has occurred by
application of two separate bodies of law referred to as “droit
modern” and “droit musulman” (modern law and Islamic law).
The “droit modern” is based on the French civil law codes and
practices.174 It covers civil and commercial areas in general.
Commercial law is the area where the European pattern is most
prevalent because of the need to communicate with the rest of the
world. Commercial and financial transactions by their nature
require flexibility, rapidity, and evolution, which probably cannot
be met in the rigidity of some Islamic rules. But Islamic precepts
in any case require the observance of good faith and they include
disclosure of defects relating to goods sold and also refraining
from misrepresentation, concealment, and fraud in commercial
transactions.
The needs of evolution are mostly required in the transnational
context. But the Islamic law had the solution inside its own nature.
Islamic laws governing business dealings substantially comply
with transnational law notwithstanding the secular imprinting of

171. N. J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 25 (1978). See also
CASTRO, supra note 19, at 13-14.
172. Tunisia adopted a uniformed legal system abolishing the Islamic courts
governing the law of personal status. See J.N. Anderson, The Tunisian Law of
Personal Status, 7 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 262 (1958).
173. See passim CASTRO, supra note 19.
174. This is true above all for Algeria and Morocco. See ZWEIGERT &
KOTZ, supra note 20, at 338; and DAVID, supra note 11, at 391-396.

98

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 2

state laws.175 In particular, business law benefits from the Shari'a's
power of adaptability that makes treaties like the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for International Sale of Goods176 fully
compatible with Islamic law principles.
V. CONCLUSION
The classic Islamic legal tradition is now facing the advance of
the western legal tradition. But there is a strong resistance.177 The
scholars were able to implement the Islamic doctrine of religious
duties in a complete legal system. The fact these rules were
formulated a long time ago and traced back, with some fictio, to
the divine authority supported the opinion that they are immutable;
they do not need governmental approval and they cannot be
abrogated.178
The Islamic principles are directed towards the creation of
a fairer business market. The same Qur’an affirms “o ye
who believe! Eat not each other’s properties by wrongful
means.”179 Khiyar al-‘aib rises a shield in defence of the
buyer, ensuring a social welfare in the trade market. The
same Holy prophet put on the businessmen a sort of metalegal protection for the fair dealing transactions when is
said that: [I]f both parties spoke the truth and describe the
defects and quantities (of the goods) then they would be
blessed in their transactions and if they told lies or
175. F. Akaddaf, Application of the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) to Arab Islamic Countries.
Is the CISG Compatible with Islamic Law Principles?, 13 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1,
31-34 (2001). See also DAVID, supra note 11, at 399.
176. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for International Sale of
Goods (CISG) applies to international transactions involving the sale of goods
and aims to promote international trade by removing legal barriers in
transactions between international traders.
177. See P.J. Riga, Islamic Law and Modernity: Conflict and Evolution, 36
AM. J. JURIS. 103, 103-117 (1991); and D. Karl, Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia:
What Foreign Attorneys Should Know, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L. L. & ECON. 131
(1992); see also Mallat, supra note 29, at 81-90.
178. B. Weiss, Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of Ijtihad, 26 AM
J. COMP. L. 199, 210 (1978); B. Hallaq, Legal Reasoning in Islamic Law and the
Common Law: Logic and Method, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 79 (1985).
179. QUR’AN ch. 4:29.
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concealed anything then the blessing of their transactions
will be blotted out.180
Khiyar al-‘aib and Caveat emptor share the aim of saving the
business society and the trade market181 from the unfair dealings
around defective products.182 They both have the task to ensure
the quality of the goods.
The Islamic solution, once the goods have been scrutinized,
focuses on the simplification of the transaction. When a person
purchases a good with a defect, no matter if trivial or flagrant,183if
it is not easily removable he may retain the object at its full price
or reject it; but he cannot retain it and seek for compensation for
the defect.184 Islamic commercial law implies the goods sold to be
free from defects, Islamic courts may consider the silence of the
seller fraudulent because Sharia seeks to assert the preclusion of
unjustified enrichment.185 Then in any transaction “ there must be
honest and free consent from both parties to ensure that they both
enjoy maximum benefits from the transaction and that nobody
180. It is a sort of precognition of the prisoner dilemma. See also AlBukhari, supra note 48, Volume 3, Book 34, Number 323: Narrated Hakim bin
Hizam:
The Prophet said:
The buyer and the seller have the option of cancelling or confirming the
bargain unless they separate, and if they spoke the truth and made clear
the defects of the goods, them they would be blessed in their bargain,
and if they told lies and hid some facts, their bargain would be deprived
of Allah's blessings.
181. G.M. Badr, A Survey of Islamic International Law, 76 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. PROC. 56, 59 (1982).
182. The first element is the centrality of trade, the universal respect it
carries in Muslim civilization, and the importance of commerce as the nerve of
the city and of regional or international exchange. The free movement of goods
is a key element in the intellectual structure of early Islam through to the present
period. The fact that the Prophet Muhammad started his career as a caravan
merchant is unique to the Islamic Prophecy. The original textual tradition of
Islam and of Islamic law acknowledges the importance of commerce, including
the security of long-distance trade and market sanctity, both on the ethical and
the practical level. Whatever the reality of emporia in the early Islamic Hijaz,
the tradition of an Islamic Prophet-merchant is firmly received and developed
across the centuries. The contract of sale, since early Islam, is the measuring
rod for all its “contractual sisters.” See Mallat, supra note 29, at 93.
183. BAILLIE, supra note 52, at 99.
184. Id. at 98.
185. RAYNER, supra note 69, at 229.
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should suffer from any injustice or dishonesty.”186 Allah said to
this effect, “. . . Eat not up your property among yourself in
Vanities . . .”187
Maybe the western legal tradition and the Louisiana Civil Code
of course are more rationality based while the Islamic tradition
focuses more on supreme principles with a scent of natural law
embodied in the ancestral times. I am wondering, is it not the
same way in which the common law started?
The similarities between the above mentioned legal systems’
approach to caveat emptor and duties of disclosure are uncanny.
Regardless of whether the issue is dealt with under the heading of
mistake, misrepresentation, or error and fraud, there is a
commonality of approach that cannot be missed. And yet, despite
this obvious diversity of methods, traditions and styles, it is
possible to notice an element, or better, a tendency common to the
examined regulations, that may be found, as usual, more in
operational rules than in principle statements.
Interestingly, caveat emptor is no longer the default rule in
either Louisiana or Islam. And this is also true under most modern
domestic rules, as well as under the CISG. Today's international
buyer is entitled to expect the goods to possess certain basic
qualities, even if the contract does not expressly so state. Indeed, it
would seem that caveat venditor has also become the
supplementary CISG rule.188

186. Billah, supra note 51, at 295.
187. QUR’AN 4:29.
188. E. Visser, Favor Emptoris: Does the CISG Favor the Buyer?, 67
UMKC L. REV. 77 (1998).

